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CANNIBALIZING THE CONSTITUTION:
ON TERRORISM, THE SECOND
AMENDMENT, AND THE THREAT TO
CIVIL LIBERTIES
FRANCESCA LAGUARDIA*
This article explores the links between internet radicalization, access to
weapons, and the current threat from terrorists who have been radicalized
online. The prevalence of domestic terrorism, domestic hate groups, and
online incitement and radicalization have led to considerable focus on the
tension between counterterror efforts and the First Amendment. Many
scholars recommend rethinking the extent of First Amendment protection, as
well as Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment protections, and some judges
appear to be listening. Yet the Second Amendment has avoided this
consideration, despite the fact that easy access to weapons is a necessary
ingredient for the level of threat posed by online incitement. This article
clarifies the way these civil liberties interact to create the threat, suggesting
that pro-democracy rights such as protections on speech and privacy should
not bear all the burden of compromise for the sake of protection from
terrorism.
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INTRODUCTION
At the time of this writing, the nation is still wrapping its collective mind
around the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021. In March, FBI Director
Christopher Wray named the attack domestic terrorism, 1 but the attackers
hardly fit stereotypical images of terrorists. This is not only because they are
white and our stereotypes suggest terrorists are “others,” but because the
individuals who stormed the Capitol are generally unconnected to formal
terrorist organizations or even hate groups. They are older, they come from
all areas of the country, and a surprising number of them are employed in
white-collar jobs.2 The lack of connection to hate groups or terrorist
organizations suggests these attackers were not formally radicalized or
introduced to the type of thorough indoctrination typically seen among
terrorists.3 It suggests, terrifyingly, that the process of radicalization may be
far easier than we thought.
The shocking frequency of attempted and actual attacks by violent
extremists supports this conclusion. In fall of 2020, fourteen men were
charged with planning to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, in
a series of plots the Governor and state prosecutors have described as
“domestic terrorism.”4 Mere days after news of this plot broke, another man
See Joan E. Greve, FBI Chief Calls Capitol Attack ‘Domestic Terrorism’ and Defends
US Intelligence, GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2021, 12:31 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news
/2021/mar/02/fbi-christopher-wray-capitol-attack-domestic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/9LN
W-XBS3].
2
See Robert A. Pape & Kevin Ruby, The Capitol Rioters Aren’t Like Other Extremists,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/02/the-capitolrioters-arent-like-other-extremists/617895/ [https://perma.cc/4W6H-GK9X].
3
See discussion infra Section I.A.
4
David Eggert & Ed White, Michigan Governor: ‘Domestic Terrorists’ Targeted Her,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 9, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/gretchen-whitmer-vacationhomes-archive-michigan-9eef9d8cf48542a455a7dbfe102a54c9 [https://perma.cc/9LSP-D9C
V]; John Flesher & Anna Liz Nichols, Another Suspect Charged in Alleged Michigan Kidnap
Plot, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 15, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/michigan-gretchen1
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was arrested for threatening to kidnap and kill the Mayor of Wichita,
Kansas.5 That man was reportedly acting based on his own beliefs that the
Mayor’s mask mandate amounted to “tyranny.”6 In the same week, a neoNazi pleaded guilty to federal hate crimes charges in connection to his plot
to bomb a synagogue in Colorado,7 and twenty-one members of a white
supremacist gang in Utah were arrested on drug and firearms charges.8
These arrests highlight the threat from white supremacists and rightwing extremists described by the FBI and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI),9 but they also highlight three less remarkedupon characteristics of the contemporary extremist threat. The first aspect is
the way in which the contemporary threat is largely reliant on online
connections to recruit and radicalize potential members. Both the state and
federal complaints against the defendants in the Whitmer case refer to the
online recruitment strategies of the relevant militia,10 while the Holzer (neoNazi) complaint describes the use of online communication to obtain

whitmer-lansing-46e0a8b30dd62d82f2a9845d2f5bea38[https://perma.cc/S84E-7YJ2]. While
eight members have been charged under state domestic terrorism statutes, six have been
charged federally with conspiracy to commit kidnapping. Affidavit in Support of Complaint,
People v. Higgins, No. 202924FY3 (Mich. Dist. Ct. Oct. 13, 2020), available at https://www.
michigan.gov/documents/ag/affidavit_-_public_facing_-_HIGGINS_705198_7.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/3RAJ-GQ82] [hereinafter Michigan Affidavit]; Complaint, United States v. Fox, No.
1:20-mj-416 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmi/press-release
/file/1326161/download [https://perma.cc/26CP-ZCTB] [hereinafter Criminal Complaint].
5
Timothy Bella, Wichita Man Arrested for Allegedly Threatening to Kidnap and Kill
Mayor Over City’s Mask Mandate, Police Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2020, 6:55 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/10/19/wichita-mayor-kidnapping-threat-masks-coron
avirus/ [https://perma.cc/N8VP-HRKS].
6
Id.
7
Colleen Slevin, Man Described as Neo-Nazi Pleads Guilty in Synagogue Plot,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 15, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/race-and-ethnicity-hate-crimes
-colorado-crime-bc3751ea976973c2b3952acba25cd287 [https://perma.cc/8DK8-7CTL].
8
Scott Neuman, 21 Alleged White Supremacists Indicted in Utah on Federal Drug and
Firearms Charges, NPR (Oct. 16, 2020, 6:11 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/16/9247276
39/21-alleged-white-supremacists-indicted-in-utah-on-federal-drug-and-firearms-char [https:
//perma.cc/88PQ-UBPE].
9
Zolan Kanno-Youngs, F.B.I. Director Warns of Russian Interference and White
Supremacist Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/us
/politics/fbi-russia.html [https://perma.cc/L7X6-FB8S]; OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL.,
DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM POSES HEIGHTENED THREAT IN 2021 (2021), https://int.nyt.
com/data/documenttools/biden-administration-domestic-extremist-report-march-2021/ab0bb
df0a8034aea/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z628-K5RP] [hereinafter ODNI].
10
Michigan Affidavit, supra note 4, at 1; Criminal Complaint, supra note 4, at 4–5.
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resources to attack the synagogue.11 A recent threat assessment by New
Jersey’s Department of Homeland Security highlighted the use of online
platforms to radicalize and incite predisposed audiences, and a March 2021
ODNI report suggests the same.12
A second important aspect of the current threat is the frantic activity of
domestic militias, which are increasing in both in groups and in
membership.13 The ODNI report specifically points to elevated threats from
violent extremists associated with militias and the likely continued growth of
those militias.14 A third, associated aspect of the contemporary extremist
threat is its pure political and nationalist strain—extremists appear to
genuinely believe that they are combating tyranny.15 This political and
nationalist activity directly confronts core First Amendment, Second
Amendment, and Fourth Amendment principles.16 The increasing presence
of online radicalization has led some to call for limitations on internet
speech,17 while others call for new statutes and investigatory authorities in
the area of domestic terrorism,18 and still more call for limitations on Second
Amendment rights.19 Each of these suggestions poses a serious threat to
traditional understandings of our constitutional rights and the balance
between liberty and security.

11

See Complaint at 4–6, United States v. Holzer, No. 1:19-mj-00246 (D. Colo. Nov. 2,
2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1215121/download [https://perma.cc/G
9VF-NTVF] [hereinafter Holzer Complaint].
12
N.J. OFF. OF HOMELAND SEC. AND PREPAREDNESS, 2020–2021 SUPPLEMENTAL THREAT
ASSESSMENT: THE CONVERGENCE OF COVID-19, NATIONWIDE CIVIL UNREST, AND THE
UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 5 (2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54d79f88
e4b0db3478a04405/t/5f6a57939d312b03d3c67a7f/1600804757127/NJOHSP+2020-2021+S
upplemental+Threat+Assessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU2C-73VN]); ODNI, supra note 9,
at 3.
13
Patrik Jonsson & Noah Robertson, With Militias on the Rise, States Boost Vigilance,
CS MONITOR (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2020/1015/Withmilitias-on-the-rise-states-boost-vigilance [https://perma.cc/2GPT-XYW7].
14
ODNI, supra note 9, at 2.
15
See Michigan Affidavit, supra note 4; Criminal Complaint, supra note 4; Holzer
Complaint, supra note 11; Pape & Ruby, supra note 2.
16
See discussion infra Part II.
17
See infra notes 45, 63–64 and accompanying text.
18
Mary B. McCord, It’s Time for Congress to Make Domestic Terrorism a Federal
Crime, LAWFARE (Dec. 5, 2018 9:13 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-congressmake-domestic-terrorism-federal-crime [https://perma.cc/ZS8A-DFVR]; Jesse J. Norris, Why
Dylann Roof Is a Terrorist Under Federal Law, and Why It Matters, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
259, 259 (2017).
19
See Paolo G. Corso, Gun Control to Major Tom: An Analysis of Failed Gun
Regulations and the Terrorist Watchlist, 12 U. MASS. L. REV. 376, 405–09 (2017).
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This article argues that the current threat of terrorism is created not just
by online radicalization and speech, but also, and in combination with,
Second Amendment protections. The internet, in reliance on the availability
of weapons, has drastically changed the level of threat posed by extremists.20
Focus on the importance of Second Amendment protections has encouraged
conditions requiring First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment protections
to deteriorate. Our Second Amendment rights are, therefore, steadily
devouring the rest of our rights.
This article begins with a review of the modern state of terrorism, to
give context to both the threats and opportunities for law enforcement that
are often ignored by purely legal arguments. It then moves to a description
of the First Amendment protection of advocacy of government overthrow,
the boundaries of incitement, and the ways in which terrorism and online
recruitment are causing scholars and judges to rethink these questions. Next,
the article offers a brief overview of these same concerns in the areas of
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights. It then proceeds to the question
of Second Amendment rights, in particular the right, claimed by modern
militias, to form a militia in preparation for war with a tyrannical
government, and the way access to weapons affects the prior questions of
rights.
I. THE NEW AGE OF TERRORISM—FASTER, SMALLER THREATS
Recent developments in the nature and strategies of terrorism have led
some to argue that we are seeing the beginning of a new wave of terrorism,
that of individual, online-inspired terrorists.21 These online inspired attackers
are self-directed, meaning they act without specific instruction from a
representative of a terrorist organization; they tend to use smaller attacks, but
are radicalized more quickly, with less effort from terrorist organizations.
These differences have obvious repercussions for the imminence and
likelihood of attacks in response to varying levels of speech encouraging
violence.
20

See discussion infra Part III.
See, e.g., David Rapoport, The Four Waves of Modern Terror: International
Dimensions and Consequences, in AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF TERRORISM: WESTERN AND
NON-WESTERN EXPERIENCES 282–311 (J. M. Hanhimäki & B. Blumenau eds., 2013); Martin
J. Gallagher, The 2016 ‘Lone Wolf’ Tsunami – Is Rapoport’s ‘Religious Wave’ Ending?, 10 J.
STRATEGIC SEC. 60, 62–64 (2017); Jerrold Post, Terrorism and Right-Wing Extremism: The
Changing Face of Terrorism and Political Violence in the 21st Century: The Virtual
Community of Hatred, 65 INT’L J. GRP. PSYCHOTHERAPY 243, 248–52 (2015). See generally
JEFFREY SIMON, LONE WOLF TERRORISM: UNDERSTANDING THE GROWING THREAT (2013)
(restating Rappaport’s theory of four waves of terrorism and suggesting lone wolf terrorism
as a fifth wave).
21
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A. WHAT MAKES TERRORISM (REALLY) DANGEROUS

There is extensive literature on what makes some terrorist organizations
more successful in killing people.22 A small attack that scares and injures the
public but kills very few people requires an organization or attacker with very
different capabilities and structure from “spectacular” attacks that can kill
dozens or hundreds of people. And an attack against an unguarded target like
a park may require very different capabilities and structure from an attack
against soldiers or protected buildings.23 Scholars have suggested that the
lethality of terrorist organizations may be affected by their ideology (that may
be more or less permissive or encouraging of indiscriminate violence);24
resources (providing larger weapons, space to train, recruits to utilize in
attacks, and experts to help train recruits);25 and organizational structure
(which allows for superior training, and education regarding strategy as well
as possible targets and weaknesses).26
The difficulty motivating and training individuals to launch successful
attacks plays into each of the factors mentioned above.27 Charismatic leaders
22
See, e.g., Victor Asal & R. Karl Rethemeyer, The Nature of the Beast: Organizational
Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks, 70 J. POL. 437, 438 (2008); Kim Cragin & Sara A.
Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a
Changing World, RAND CORP. (2004), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1782
.html [https://perma.cc/B79V-BK2H].
23
See, e.g., Cragin and Daly, supra note 22, at 14–17.
24
Ideology is important for purposes of unifying and mobilizing recruits, and enabling
them to step outside of the normal social constraints on killing people. See, e.g., Martha
Crenshaw, The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice, in
ORIGINS OF TERRORISM 7–24 (Walter Reich ed., 1998); Albert Bandura, Mechanisms of Moral
Disengagement, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM 161–90 (Walter Reich ed., 1998); SIDNEY TARROW,
POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND POLITICS 118–34
(1994).
25
David Boyns & James David Ballard, Developing a Sociological Theory for the
Empirical Understanding of Terrorism, 35 AM. SOCIO. 5, 14 (2004); Asal & Rethemeyer,
supra note 22, at 439–40, 444–45; MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 140 (2011).
26
Asal & Rethemeyer, supra note 22, at 438–41; Cragin & Daly, supra note 22, at 26, 37, 42;
Brian J. Phillips, Deadlier in the US? On Lone Wolves, Terrorist Groups, and Attack
Lethality, 29 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 533, 539 (2017).
27
See Thomas Hegghammer, Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi
Arabia, 13 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 39, 49–53 (2006) (detailing that though most QAP recruits were
top down, even bottom-up recruits to Afghanistan required a process of socialization,
including peer pressure, before joining a terrorist group); The Use of the Internet by Islamic
Extremists: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. On Intel., 109th Cong. 15 (2004)
(statement of Bruce Hoffman), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/
2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5HL-TSDR]; JEROME BJELOPERA, AMERICAN
JIHADIST TERRORISM: CONFRONTING A COMPLEX THREAT 13–14 (2013); RANDY BORUM,
PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM 57 (2007) (giving a general overview of theories and studies of
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may be important in order to attract and retain recruits, as well as to motivate
them to violate strongly enforced social norms.28 To facilitate this process,
terrorist organizations need strong and safe lines of communication and
publicity in order to reach their recruits and potential recruits.29 Recruits are
likely to need either to travel to a safe area where they may be trained or to
communicate with these specific leaders in order to reach a level where they
are willing and able to launch attacks.30
Radicalizing a recruit to be able to engage in violence is difficult,
typically requiring up to six years of effort. 31 The process of radicalization
heavily implicates speech rights, as terrorists have traditionally been
motivated by a sense of moral outrage in response to abusive government
policies.32 But the requirements above have often protected states from
terrorism by giving clear areas where they can disrupt training or identify
potential recruits.33 In contrast, the modern terrorist threat is more broadly
dispersed than the traditional “most lethal” terrorism discussed above,
making disruption more difficult and smaller attacks more likely.34

the process of radicalization). See generally SCOTT GERWEHR & SARA DALY, AL-QAIDA:
TERRORIST SELECTION AND RECRUITMENT (2006) (outlining the processes and methods of
terrorist recruitment), https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1214.html [https://perma.cc/VV
Z4-6VNW]; MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS (2004) (describing the
steps of radicalization and the importance of a long process of building relationships and
feelings of personal responsibility).
28
PETER R. NEUMANN & BROOKE ROGERS, RECRUITMENT AND MOBILISATION FOR
ISLAMIST MILITANT MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE 56–65 (2008); SAGEMAN, supra note 27.
29
Cragin & Daly, supra note 22, at 37, 42; BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 131–36
(2006).
30
Cragin & Daly, supra note 22, at xiii–xiv, 45–50; Asal & Rethemeyer, supra note 22, at
446–47; SAGEMAN, supra note 25, at 139–41.
31
ALISON SMITH, HOW RADICALIZATION TO TERRORISM OCCURS IN THE UNITED STATES:
WHAT RESEARCH SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE TELLS US 6 (2018),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250171.pdf [https://perma.cc/97YN-D5BU]; BORUM,
supra note 27, at 27 (generally describing the process of radicalization, and detailing the
general agreement that “terrorists do not become terrorists over night.”).
32
SAGEMAN, supra note 25, at 65–91.
33
See generally PETER BERGEN AND BRUCE HOFFMAN, ASSESSING THE TERRORIST
THREAT: A REPORT OF THE BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER’S NATIONAL SECURITY PREPAREDNESS
GROUP (2010) (describing the threat as coming primarily from recruits who travel overseas to
train), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/NSPG-Final
-Threat-Assessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4QE-9ZGH].
34
See, e.g., Ramon Spaaij, The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment,
33 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 854, 872 (2010); Brent Smith, Jeff Gruenewald, Paxton
Roberts & Kelly R. Damphousse, The Emergence of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Patterns of
Behavior and Implications for Intervention, in TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM TODAY
104 (Mathieu Deflem ed., 2015); BERGEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 33, at 31.
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B. MODERN TERRORISM—QUANTITY OVER QUALITY

Sometime around 2010, the goals and structures of (many) terrorist
organizations began to change.35 Rather than attempting spectacular or
military attacks, terrorist organizations began to encourage individuals to
engage in lower level, self-directed attacks.36 These attacks rarely rely on
bombs.37 Instead, self-directed attacks tend to use (relatively) low lethality
weapons such as guns, knives, and vehicles.38 While these low-level plots
may be less lethal individually, they are more difficult to detect and prevent
as they can be completed without the communication or travel that might
once have alerted authorities.39
Self-directed attackers seem more predisposed to violence than
traditional, organizationally-led terrorists.40 Scholars have observed that selfdirected attackers also seem more likely to be responding to personal
grievances and/or alienation by latching onto the terrorist ideology, rather
than having to be thoroughly indoctrinated and radicalized by a strong
ideology.41 Some researchers have suggested self-directed terrorists need no
35

See infra notes 36–37.
JYTTE KLAUSEN, THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE EVOLUTION OF AL QAEDAINSPIRED VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990–2015 5–7, 15–16 (2016); Jytte
Klausen, Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria
and Iraq, 38 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1–22 (2015); BJELOPERA, supra note 27, at 8–9;
SAGEMAN, supra note 25, at 71, 133–46; Scott Stewart, Jihadism: The Grassroots Paradox,
STRATFOR (Mar. 18, 2010 8:59 AM), https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/jihadismgrassroots-paradox [https://perma.cc/CJ4R-T3T9]; MARK S. HAMM & RAMÓN SPAAIJ, THE
AGE OF LONE WOLF TERRORISM 35–58 (2017); Glenn E. Robinson, The Four Waves of Global
Jihad, 1979–2017, 24 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 70, 72, 83–84 (2017) (describing the current wave of
global jihadist terrorism as the fourth wave, consisting of an online network urging likeminded individuals to small scale, self-directed attacks); SMITH, supra note 31, at 6, 17.
37
KLAUSEN, supra note 36, at 15; HAMM & SPAAIJ, supra note 36, at 35–58; BJELOPERA,
supra note 27, at 8–9; see also Petter Nesser, Single Actor Terrorism: Scope, Characteristics
and Explanations, 6 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 61, 64 (2012).
38
KLAUSEN, supra note 36, at 15; HAMM & SPAAIJ, supra note 36, at 35–58; BJELOPERA,
supra note 27, at 8–9.
39
Nesser, supra note 37, at 64; BJELOPERA, supra note 27, at 9–10 (describing the call
for smaller scale attacks and noting that these less sophisticated attacks pose problems for law
enforcement).
40
Studies of traditional terrorists have often contradicted efforts to suggest that
traditional, group-focused terrorism is a product of mental illness, abuse, or poor family life.
SAGEMAN, supra note 25, at 62. But these online-encouraged, self-directed attackers are, so
far, understudied, as up until 2010 their appearance among terror attacks was rare. Clark
McCauley, Sophia Moskalenko & Benjamin Van Son, Characteristics of Lone-Wolf Violent
Offenders: A Comparison of Assassins and School Attackers, 7 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 4, 7
(2013).
41
McCauley, Moskalenko & Van Son, supra note 40, at 15–17; Spaaij, supra note 34,
at 861–62; Nesser, supra note 37, at 61–73; CHARLES A. EBY, THE NATION THAT CRIED LONE
36
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formal ideology at all, but rather that an extreme response to personal
grievances is all that is required, and a unique, personal ideology may
become mixed up in those grievances, in part, as an excuse.42 Sudden loss or
strain (such as family disruption, or job loss) is hypothesized to make such
terrorism more likely by removing an individual’s connection to society,
reducing the pull of social norms, and thereby reducing the individual’s
“restraint in reacting to grievance with violence.”43
The movement to small-scale, self-directed attacks was a conscious
strategy among terror organizations, facilitated by the ability to radicalize
individuals over the internet.44 It relies on the online community’s own
knowledge about local vulnerabilities and the attackers’ own capabilities,
using whatever weapons they have available.45 Self-directed terrorists often
have a history of firearms use and/or training,46 cutting the time needed for
training as well as the travel that might be associated with it. The internet has
also cut the time of radicalization from an average of five or six years before
2010, to less than two years since 2010.47 This type of terrorism is as
prevalent and successful as it is, in large part, because the internet makes it
possible. Terrorism recruitment has flourished online.48 In response, U.S.
scholars and judges are rethinking their protective stance towards online
speech, as is described in the next Part.
II. EATING AWAY AT THE ANTI-TYRANNICAL BILL OF RIGHTS
It may seem redundant to state that many aspects of the Bill of Rights
protect against tyrannical government. But, in the context of the pressure
some rights place on others and the typical anti-tyranny language of Second
Amendment literature, it is worth briefly restating these fundamental

WOLF: A DATA-DRIVEN ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL TERRORISTS IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE
9/11 at 12-16 (2012), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/6789 [https://perma.cc/FEN6-JD
9R].
42
McCauley, Moskalenko & Van Son, supra note 40, at 8; BORUM, supra note 27, at 26;
Spaaij, supra note 34, at 861–62; Eby, supra note 41, at 13, 15–16.
43
McCauley, Moskalenko & Van Son, supra note 40, at 17.
44
KLAUSEN, supra note 36, at 3, 33–34.
45
BJELOPERA, supra note 27, at 8.
46
McCauley, Moskalenko & Van Son, supra note 40, at 10, 14–15; Noémie Bouhana,
Emily Corner, Paul Gill & Bart Schuurman, Background and Preparatory Behaviours of
Right-Wing Extremist Lone Actors: A Comparative Study, 12 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 150, 158
(2018).
47
SMITH, supra note 31, at 6.
48
See Alexander Tsesis, Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 605, 608–13 (2017); J.M. Berger, Tailored Online Interventions: The
Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy, 8 CTC SENTINEL 19, 19 (2015).
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purposes and noting how scholarly and judicial attitudes toward civil liberties
have changed.
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT

An underlying function of the First Amendment is to protect against
tyrannical government control of thought and debate.49 If people are to
control their government, they must be able to make determinations about
political questions without the state interfering.50 Moreover, this protection
must extend even to radical speech, or speech that advocates the overthrow
of government, because whether a government is tyrannical and deserving of
being overthrown is an inherently political and core political issue.51 Yet,
even given this background, the First Amendment originally was understood
to be far less protective than currently employed.52 In the early twentieth
century the Supreme Court was still willing to accept the notion that
Congress could limit speech that posed a real risk of serious harm (whether
that harm was a decrease in men willing to sign up to serve in the army, active
attempts to overthrow the government, or other criminal activity).53

49
See, e.g., GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 7–8 (2004) (discussing the importance of
free speech for democracy in order to protect against government officials “manipulat[ing]
public discourse in order to preserve their authority.”).
50
Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2362–63, 2366–69 (2000); see also David Cole, The First Amendment’s
Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 173 (2012) (citations omitted) (“A liberal democracy requires
that its citizens be free to speak their minds, criticize the government, and join forces with
like-minded others in those pursuits. The ability to associate and speak with domestic
organizations is therefore at the very core of the First Amendment’s democratic purpose . . . .
It is virtually impossible to imagine meaningful self-government if the state can prohibit
speech in coordination with domestic political groups it disfavors.”); STONE, supra note 49, at
7–8.
51
STONE, supra note 49, at 5 (“The paradigm violation of the First Amendment is a law
forbidding citizens to criticize their government’s policies”); id. at 532 (“Insofar as
government silences dissent . . . it . . . undermines the very essence of self-government.”);
Cole, supra note 50, at 173; see also Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of
National Security and Internet Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 385 (2017) (“[T]he
early twentieth-century Supreme Court recognized that advocacy of unlawfulness has social
value, even if its decisions did not always reflect that. Without some type of meaningful
constitutional scrutiny, government regulation of such expression could realistically suppress
or chill what we might recognize as pure expressions of ideology.”).
52
See Richard Ashby Wilson & Jordan Kiper, Incitement in an Era of Populism:
Updating Brandenburg After Charlottesville, 5 U. PA. J. L. & PUB. AFF. 189, 196–97 (2020).
53
Wilson & Kiper, supra note 52, at 197–200.
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The more protective, “modern” view of First Amendment protection of
dissent is enshrined in Brandenburg v. Ohio.54 There, the Court expressly
stated that the harm that might result from speech “‘justif[ying]’ the
commission of violent acts” as part of advocacy for criminal syndicalism was
inadequately imminent danger to support a prohibition on that speech.55 The
Brandenburg decision moved away from a general calculation of overall
risk,56 and toward a requirement that speech be intended and likely to cause
imminent lawless action—an extremely limiting interpretation.57 Some have
suggested Brandenburg’s imminence requirement is a response to the
principle that courts should allow speech whenever there is an opportunity
for counterspeech that could remedy the harms of the speech—in other
words, that governments can and should rely on responses to speech in order
to limit its harmful effects, rather than relying on censorship (when the harm
is not imminent, so that there is time for responses to occur).58
But in recent cases, courts have found incitement regardless of the
chronological imminence of the threat. In People v. Rubin,59 the defendant,
at a press conference, held up five hundred dollars and said he would give
them to any person who “kills, maims, or seriously injures a member of the
American Nazi Party [at a rally to be held five weeks later].”60 The California
Court of Appeals found that five weeks lead time qualified as “imminent.”
The court’s logic seems to fit well with an overall risk based calculation,
relying on relative certainty and severity of harm rather than pure speed.61
People v. Bohmer added a consideration of the receptiveness of the audience,
which would make harm more likely.62

54
JoAnne Sweeney, Incitement in the Era of Trump and Charlottesville, 47 CAP. U. L.
REV. 585, 593 (2019); Wilson & Kiper, supra note 52, at 202; David S. Han, Brandenburg
and Terrorism in the Digital Age, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 85, 85 (2019).
55
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 445, 447–49 (1969).
56
Adopted in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 542 (1951).
57
This movement was cemented in two following cases: Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105,
108 (1973) and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 886–87 (1982). The Court
has not decided another incitement case since.
58
See generally Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look
at the Old Remedy for “Bad” Speech, 2000 BYU L. REV. 553 (2000); Vincent Blasi, Reading
Holmes Through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343,
1357 (1997).
59
People v. Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. 488 (Ct. App. 1979).
60
Id. at 488.
61
Id. at 492. The court stated “the imminence of an event is related to its nature. A total
eclipse of the sun next year is said to be imminent. An April shower thirty minutes away is
not.” Id.
62
See People v. Bohmer, 120 Cal. Rptr. 136, 144–45 (Ct. App. 1975).
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In each of these ways—receptiveness of audience, opportunities for
counterspeech, and likelihood of harm—the calculation of risk changed in
the age of the internet. As an example, in United States v. White, the
defendant’s online statement that his target (and others) deserved
assassination along with his online publication of identifying information
about his target was deemed sufficiently “imminent” to qualify as solicitation
to murder.63 The Seventh Circuit’s logic was that “a reasonable jury could
conclude [the post on the website that tailored to Neo-Nazis] was specifically
designed to reach as many white supremacist readers as possible so that
someone could kill or harm Juror A.”64
United States v. White demonstrates the unimportance of immediacy in
the face of inevitability. The internet allows for immediate, unfiltered
communication,65 but at the same time, much of the concerning language to
be found on the internet will be “‘heard’ well after [it is] ‘spoken’,” and is
sent out to unknown readers who may react in any number of ways. 66 This
lack of imminence and directed speech arguably heightens, rather than
lessening the probability of the risk occurring, as it may reach a broader
audience, or one better primed to act on the speech.67
The connection between internet chat groups and action is clarified in
Sines v. Kessler,68 the civil suit brought by counterprotestors at the Unite the
Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, where Heather Heyer (a
counterprotestor) was killed. Plaintiffs in that suit point to conversations
which included incendiary rhetoric on an internet platform hosting many
white supremacist groups, including the use of racial slurs, exhortations to
violence, and promises of violence. 69 None of this speech was specifically
directed at any victim or particular known listener. But some specific violent
tactics mentioned were eventually used at the rally, including the use of
63
United States v. White, 610 F.3d 956, 1015 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. White,
698 F.3d 1005, 1016 (7th Cir. 2012).
64
White, 698 F.3d at 1016.
65
Peter Margulies, The Clear and Present Internet: Terrorism, Cyberspace, and the
First Amendment, 8 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2004); Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time
of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 706–07 (2009).
66
Sweeney, supra note 54, at 598 (quoting John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the
First Amendment: The Framework for an Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REV.
425, 428, 450–51 (2002)); see also J. Remy Green, Digitizing Brandenburg: Common Law
Drift Toward a Causal Theory of Imminence, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 351, 360–63, 385 (2019);
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 147, 160
(2011); Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651, 667, 669
(2017).
67
See Chen, supra note 51, at 393; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC 2.0 69 (2007).
68
Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765, 773 (W.D. Va. 2018).
69
Id. at 777.
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pepper spray70 and running over protestors in crosswalks (a practice which
not only killed Heather Heyer, but was repeated at least 104 times at Black
Lives Matter protests between May and September of 2020).71
The knowledge that the internet has become a primary means of terrorist
radicalization and recruitment72 adds to the awareness that the threat posed
by online speech is far more than hypothetical. On this basis, many scholars
have begun discussing the need to update the Brandenburg standard to be
less speech protective,73 while others suggest removing certain online speech
platforms entirely.74 The nature of internet communications makes this a
particularly difficult discussion, however. Even as the internet has added to
the dangers of radical speech, it has become an essential part of public
dissemination and absorption about news and therefore political
knowledge.75 The dangers of chilling or infringing on that speech are
significant.
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AS ANTI-TYRANNY

Minds reach most often for the First Amendment when considering the
broad democratic ideals described above—the formation of public opinion,
and the formation of oppositional groups to governmental policies. But in
fact, the Fourth Amendment, and all of the criminal justice-related
Amendments, have partial roots in these anti-tyrannical ideas.76
70

Id. at 777, 778, 785, 789, 791, 796, 803.
Grace Hauck, Cars Have Hit Demonstrators 104 Times Since George Floyd Protests
Began, USA TODAY (July 9, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/07/08
/vehicle-ramming-attacks-66-us-since-may-27/5397700002/ [https://perma.cc/A59U-RJUA].
72
See Rachel E. VanLandingham, Jailing the Twitter Bird: Social Media, Material
Support to Terrorism, and Muzzling the Modern Press, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2017);
Karen J. Greenberg, Counter-Radicalization via the Internet, 668 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 165, 166–67 (2016); see also Paul Gill, Emily Corner, Maura Conway, Amy
Thornton, Mia Bloom & John Horgan, Terrorist Use of the Internet by the Numbers:
Quantifying Behaviors, Patterns, and Processes, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 99, 107-111
(2017); J.M. Berger, supra note 48 at 19; Rahma Sugihartati, Bagong Suyanto & Mun’im
Sirry, The Shift From Consumers to Prosumers: Susceptibility of Young Adults to
Radicalization, 9 SOC. SCIS. 40, 40 (2020).
73
Han, supra note 54, at 109; Sweeney, supra note 54, at 637; Green, supra note 66, at
354, 385; Lidsky, supra note 66, at 164.
74
Greenberg, supra note 72, at 175.
75
VanLandingham, supra note 72, at 9, 12–13, 22.
76
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI, VIII; Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss,
A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 867–71
(1994) (discussing generally the origins of the Sixth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment);
Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the New Fifth
Amendment and the Old Voluntariness Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 78 (1966) (describing the
protections against compulsion and torture as protection against tyranny).
71
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The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on general warrants is a direct
response to the use of such warrants “to enforce libel laws and suppress
dissent in England.”77 English licensing and copyright laws were used to
heavily influence the political materials generally available to readers. 78
Criticism of the king in particular was prosecuted as seditious libel, not only
subject to general warrants in order to search for any and all relevant material
but also subject to interrogation in the Star Chamber.79 The Star Chamber
was infamous not only for the brutality of the interrogation therein,80 but also
its secrecy,81 and its failure to require that the King show cause for detainees’
detention.82 This history of political suppression looms large in American
foundations of due process, the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination (in part as response to the coercive interrogations famously
conducted in the Star Chamber), the right to a public trial, and the prohibition
on the suspension of habeas corpus.83 These connections are recognized in
Supreme Court doctrine as well.84
Again, the internet has fundamentally changed the nature of these
protections. First, the internet and big data have overwhelmingly changed the
type of information governments can gather on citizens, and therefore its
77
Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the ThirdParty Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 247, 250 (2016); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The
Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 63, 69,
78 (1996) (arguing that the threat to political speech is one reason general warrants were
prohibited when writs of assistance were allowed).
78
Price, supra note 77, at 251.
79
Id.
80
Price cites William Prynne, a prominent Puritan, as among the better known instances
of excessive punishment for seditious libel. Id. Prynne was convicted twice of publishing
libelous works against the state and the king. As a part of his punishment, his ears were cut
off in the pillories at Westminster and Cheapside and his forehead was branded with an S.L.,
for “Seditious Libeller.” See generally Emory Washburn, The Court of Star Chamber, 12 AM.
L. REV. 727, 747–48 (1877).
81
Thomas S. Schattenfield, The Right to a Public Trial, 7 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 78, 80
(1955).
82
Jared Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165, 1190 (2007).
83
Id.; “[I]t is through the agency of public trials that the freedoms most evident to the
average individual, those of speech, press, religion and assembly, are enforced.” Schattenfield,
supra note 81, at 78 . Frank Riebli, The Spectre of Star Chamber: The Role of an Ancient
English Tribunal in the Supreme Court’s Self-Incrimination Jurisprudence, 29 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 807 at 807-809 (2002) (describing the Supreme Court’s use of the Star Chamber
as a foil, against which the importance of civil liberties are educed)
84
Riebli, supra note 83, at 828. “Some of those who came to these shores were Puritans
who had known the hated oath ex officio used both by Star Chamber and the High
Commission. They had known the great rebellion of Lilburn, Cartwright and others against
those instruments of oppression.” Id. (quoting Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 446
(1956)).
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opportunities to prosecute dissenters.85 The use of the internet is increasingly
a necessity, rather than a choice, and the Third Party doctrine arguably opens
the door wide to general surveillance by government.86 Nearly all
conversations that might once have been conducted in private, over
(normally) unrecorded phone lines, or on burnable or shreddable paper, are
now conducted on stored data in the form of e-mail, chat, or social media.87
This exponentially increases the ability of government to gather data,
records, and substantive conversations from individuals.88
The same online characteristics that complicate the incitement calculus
(described supra Section II.A.) create a heightened desire to analyze all
available internet data.89 Indeed, the interest in preventing terrorist attacks
has led to government pressure not only on current Fourth Amendment
doctrine, but on technological advancement that might make surveillance
impossible, such as total encryption, or the automatic deletion of messages.90
Not only does the government want the ability to search existing material,
the government also wants the ability to prevent individuals from deleting or
encrypting that material (as individuals might once have burned letters in
order to prevent their being read).91
85
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1089–1102 (2002); Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory
of High-Tech Government Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 473, 494 (1999); Chris J.
Chasin, The Revolution Will Be Tweeted, but the Tweets Will Be Subpoenaed: Reimagining
Fourth Amendment Privacy to Protect Associational Anonymity, 2014 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. &
POL’Y 1, 9–10 (2014).
86
See generally Price, supra note 77 (describing the steady creep of the third party
doctrine to threaten Fourth Amendment privacy rights in the digital age); Laura K. Donohue,
The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 553, 558 (2017).
87
Nicole Friess, When Rummaging Goes Digital: Fourth Amendment Particularity and
Stored E-Mail Surveillance, 90 NEB. L. REV. 971, 972 (2012).
88
See generally Price, supra note 77; Donohue, supra note 86, at 535.
89
Solove, supra note 85, at 1084.
90
See Laurent Sacharoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted
Devices, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 209 (2018); STAFF OF H. JUD. COMM. & H. ENERGY &
COM. COMM., 114TH CONG., ENCRYPTION WORKING GROUP YEAR-END REP. (2016), https://
publicintelligence.net/us-houseencryptionworkinggroup-2016/ [https://perma.cc/8AUS-K5X
T]; STAFF OF H. HOMELAND SEC. COMM. MAJORITY, 114TH CONG., GOING DARK, GOING
FORWARD: A PRIMER ON THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE (2016), https://irp.fas.org/congress/2016_
rpt/hsc-encrypt.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WHT-JBXP]; Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks on Encryption at the United States Naval Academy (Oct. 10,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers
-remarks-encryption-united-states-naval [https://perma.cc/K6HQ-8FSR] (“Encrypted communications that cannot be intercepted and locked devices that cannot be opened are law-free
zones that permit criminals and terrorists to operate without detection.”).
91
Sacharoff, supra note 90, at 206–10 (describing law enforcement frustration with
encryption).
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But as the government’s abilities to oversee online communications
increase, so does the risk of chilling speech.92 The government’s interest in
the online activities of political activists has already arisen as a topic of
concern.93 And while scholars disagree as to whether the increased oversight
is positive or negative, they agree that court doctrine currently allows
surveillance to be more possible and prevalent, and privacy is rapidly
decreasing.94
III. THE WITCHES BREW—THE INTERNET, ALGORITHMS,
PREDISPOSITION, AND GUNS
It is true that the internet has changed the risks that are posed by radical
speech, and the reasons for that are outlined below. But if this threat gives
reason to infringe on the rights and liberties that are foundational to our
government, we should respond in a manner that best protects democratic
self-determination. The internet is not the only changing factor in this
calculus, and our civil liberties might be better protected with a fuller view
of the danger. Section III.B. outlines the important role of weapons to our
new state of threat.
A. MAKING IT EASY—THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES OF
INTERNET SPEECH

Scholars and government officials suggesting we should modify First
Amendment protections in light of modern terrorism and the internet have
focused on recruitment and radicalization.95 There are obvious reasons for
this. Successful terrorist groups traditionally have required a steady stream
of recruits, and a process of radicalization that relies heavily on political
speech.96 Perhaps more specifically, the internet has changed the dynamic of
terrorist speech and recruitment, particularly regarding the immediacy of the
threat and opportunities to respond to it.

92

Solove, supra note 85, at 1084–85.
Michael German & Sara Robinson, Wrong Priorities on Fighting Terrorism,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 2 (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files
/2019-08/Report_Wrong_Priorities_Terrorism.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLD4-PFQM].
94
See, e.g., Price, supra note 77; Susan Klein & Crystal Flinn, Social Media Compliance
Programs and the War Against Terrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 53, 96–111 (2017);
RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY 10-13 (2006) (arguing that civil liberties, including rights against surveillance,
are constitutionally limited in the face of serious threat).
95
Rachel E. VanLandingham, Words We Fear: Burning Tweets & the Politics of
Incitement, 85 BROOK. L. Rev. 37, 38, 40 (2019).
96
See supra notes 28 and 45 and accompanying text.
93
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Consider, first, the audience that can be reached via chatrooms and
social media. Even before the threat of terrorism reached general
consciousness in American society, commentators warned that the “virtually
unlimited” reach of the internet posed a threat in the form of encouragement
to commit terrorism.97 Classic First Amendment doctrine is based on the use
of leaflets98 and speeches as part of protests or political meetings.99 This
inherently limits the reach of the speech.100 Had the Brandenburg speech
been televised nationally on the most highly watched news programs of 1969,
it might have been seen (once) by some 50 million viewers.101 In contrast,
studies suggest that any of the top ten websites may be viewed between 80
and 200 million times.102
Perhaps more importantly, the 50 million viewers that would have seen
the Brandenburg speech in this hypothetical scenario would be a cross
section of the American public, not likely to be primed for a response to
incendiary material.103 Books, leaflets, and even the choice to view a
particular news program require some effort or luck for the message of the
materials to reach someone who will be convinced by it. In contrast, social
media communications infamously produce a “bubble” or “rabbit hole”
effect.104 On the internet, algorithms attract and then pigeonhole likeminded

97
Bruce Braun, Dane Drobny & Douglas C. Gessner, WWW.Commercial_Terrorism
.Com: A Proposed Federal Criminal Statute Addressing the Solicitation of Commercial
Terrorism Through the Internet, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 159, 159 (2000).
98
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 617 (1919).
99
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516 (1951) (upholding conviction for the
“teaching and advocacy of” overthrowing the government); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 359–60 (1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per
curiam).
100
Abrams involved the use of all of 5000 leaflets, 250 U.S. at 618, while Brandenburg
involved a speech before a few dozen men. 395 U.S. at 445–46.
101
In 1969, the population of the United States was approximately 200 million. Place
Explorer: United States, DATA COMMONS, https://datacommons.org/place/country/USA?topic
=Demographics [https://perma.cc/8A4W-NDK2]. Approximately 25% of the population
watched the nightly news. John Robinson, The Audience for National TV News Programs, 35 PUB.
OP. Q. 403, 403–05 (1971).
102
Facebook’s Algorithm: A Major Threat to Public Health, AVAAZ.ORG (Aug. 19,
2020), https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/facebook_threat_health/ [https://perma.cc/P5BD
-HF6H].
103
Robinson, supra note 101, at 403–05.
104
Derek O’Callaghan, Derek Greene, Maura Conway, Joe Carthy & Pádraig
Cunningham, Down the (White) Rabbit Hole: The Extreme Right and Online Recommender
Systems, 33 SOC. SCI. COMP. REV. 459, 467–74 (2015) (describing the online mechanisms that
create rabbit holes); Mark S. Kende, Social Media, the First Amendment, and Democratic
Dysfunction in the Trump Era, 68 DRAKE L. REV. 273, 282–83 (2020).
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viewers into echo chambers of self-encouragement, meaning the individuals
watching radicalizing material are also precisely the individuals most likely
to respond to such material.105 Considering the profile of the “new” terrorist
described above the sensitivity of readers and risk posed by rabbit holes
become even more apparent.106
Because rabbit holes both attract vulnerable viewers and encourage
those viewers to continue viewing websites representing similar political
views (and similar or increasing levels of extremism), they also foreclose
opportunities for counterspeech, thereby hamstringing the non-oppressive
responses relied upon in First Amendment doctrine. While organizations
such as Google, CAIR, and the United Nations have tried to create counterradicalization programs online (displaying links to material offering counternarratives in response to suggestive search terms), these programs rely on a
user to choose to explore them.107 In contrast, because online communities of
hate are comprised of individuals who have already chosen to view material
propagated by the organization, and are interested in using their own
resources to support its cause, online extremists need only sit back and wait
for algorithms to bring the most predisposed readers to their doorstep.108
Moreover, the use of bots to amplify ads and messaging wildly increases the
fishing lines out in the world to catch such predisposed individuals and reel
them in to activation.109
The difference between broadcast media and the internet is further
apparent in the element of editing, which undermines the power of expert
terrorist recruiters. Recruitment is a delicate process that requires expertise
and effort.110 Editing by the news media interferes with the direct
transmission of recruitment and incendiary materials.111 The internet allows
105

Greenberg, supra note 72, at 166–67; O’Callaghan, Greene, Conway, Carthy &
Cunningham, supra note 104, at 460, 474 (describing the purpose of algorithms as reaching
receptive audiences); Kende, supra note 104, at 282–84.
106
Lidsky, supra note 66, at 149–50; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter,
Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1575 (2007);
Janet Morahan-Martin & Phyllis Schumacher, Loneliness and Social Uses of the Internet, 19
COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 659, 660 (2003).
107
Greenberg, supra note 72, at 170–71.
108
Lydsky, supra note 66, at 49 (“the individual who conducts an Internet search for
‘white supremacy’ will often be searching for confirmation of his own prejudices and may be
seeking support for his own violent plans or projects.”); Sweeney, supra note 54, at 602.
109
Greenberg, supra note 72, at 170–71.
110
Tim Stevens, Regulating the “Dark Web”: How a Two-Fold Approach Can Tackle
Peer-to-Peer Radicalisation, 154 RUSI J. 28, 28 (2009); Kurt Braddock, WEAPONIZED
WORDS: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF PERSUASION IN VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND COUNTERRADICALIZATION 20–22 (2020).
111
Stevens, supra note 110, at 28.
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expert recruiters complete control over content and editing, facilitating their
efforts to produce the most convincing calls to violence. News editing
interferes with this activity (for instance, the Brandenburg speech was
broadcast only in parts). Each of these factors adds to the other to make
successful incitement far more likely online than via television or print
media, supporting the argument that the danger from internet
communications is so great that immediacy itself is not necessary.112 But why
are the individuals recruited in this fashion actually successful in achieving
their violent ends? This issue is less well addressed—the immediate
availability of predisposed and pretrained potential terrorists.
B. THE SECOND AMENDMENT

While First and Fourth Amendment doctrines have bent in the face of
the threat of terrorism (and scholars suggest they may bend still further) the
Second Amendment’s strength has only increased in recent years since
incorporation of the right to bear arms was only accomplished in 2008, in
District of Columbia v. Heller.113 In Heller, the Court determined (5–4) that
the Second Amendment enshrined an individual right to self-defense (applied
against the federal government), although it could be regulated in accordance
with long-standing prohibitions on the ownership and carrying of firearms.114
Two years later the ruling was extended to apply against the states in
McDonald v. City of Chicago.115
McDonald came down in 2010, nine years after the September 11th,
2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and well into the arguments over
limitations on the First and Fourth Amendments.116 Yet, amazingly, terrorism
is almost completely ignored in this opinion.117 Additionally, in direct
contrast to the First and Fourth Amendments, the Second Amendment is
rarely analyzed in relation to the terrorist threat, by courts or legal scholars.118
112
Green, supra note 66, at 353–54, 380–82; see also supra notes 64–70 and
accompanying text.
113
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
114
Id. at 626–27.
115
561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
116
See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 65 (already addressing civil liberties concerns
relating to terrorism and the internet in 2004).
117
White supremacist terrorism in the form of the Ku Klux Klan and other such
organizations is mentioned in Justice Thomas’ concurrence as a justification for expanding
gun ownership—for Black victims to defend themselves. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 809–10.
118
A search of court opinions on Westlaw shows sixty-three cases that reference Heller
and terrorism (terrorism, terrorist, terror), out of the over 1,100 Second Amendment cases in
the lower courts. Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical
Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms after Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1434 (2018)
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Of the cases that do address terrorism and the Second Amendment, in most
the reference to terrorism comes up in an entirely separate section from the
question of the Second Amendment claim. Few cases reference terrorism as
a reason to protect the Second Amendment as an individual right: for
instance, discussing the use of weapons for self-defense against white
supremacists.119 Importantly, none reference terrorism as a reason to modify
Second Amendment protections, as is discussed in First Amendment cases.
The connection between the terrorist threat and guns received some
attention in relation to efforts to limit access to guns for those on the terrorism
watchlist, but this proposal was eventually dropped.120 Yet, the terrorist
watchlist is not entirely ignored in gun sales—whether an individual is on the
watchlist is part of the FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check
System (NICS).121 If the individual is on the watchlist, gun sales may be held
up to three days while the FBI searches for some other reason to disallow the
sale (merely being on the watchlist is not sufficient reason, and this was the
failed proposal from 2016).122 However, in 2015, 223 of 244 gun transactions
involving individuals on the terrorist watchlist were allowed to proceed.123
The popular press and policy institutes have occasionally focused on the
issue, in the wake of mass shootings,124 but no proposals to strengthen
limitations on availability of firearms have succeeded thus far.
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The absence of a discussion about terrorism in arguments about Second
Amendment rights is only more striking in the context of an apparent belief
among gun rights advocates that the Constitution enshrines a right to
individual insurgency against the United States Government.125 The extreme
end of the gun rights movement includes the notion that gun registration
requirements impede political dissent, and that “unrestricted access to guns
of every kind is an essential element of freedom.”126 Of course, if one is to
defend against tyranny and fight off the United States government, one must
have access to bombs and surface-to-air missiles, let alone automatic
firearms.127 This logic has propelled, protected, and legitimated the militia
movement, and it has done so even as rights protecting peaceful dissent have
been compromised in the face of the threat of terrorism.
Insurrection is intimately linked to terrorism. While scholars may argue
about whether all insurrectionists are terrorists,128 terrorism has often been
used as a tactic of insurrectionists.129 When we imagine a war of broadly
dispersed insurgent citizens’ militias against a tyrannical United States
government, what most of us imagine is a war of terrorism. Yet, even while
arguably blessing the rights of individuals to take up arms against the
government in this manner, United States v. Heller never addresses the threat
of terrorism nor the question of whether the Constitution is a suicide pact, as
is addressed in First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment discussions.130
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This extreme view of the Second Amendment does not only increase
the threat of terrorism by arguably protecting terrorism itself, it also
contributes to the threat of terrorism in the same ways the internet has—by
making terrorism more likely and more easily accomplished.
C. THE FINAL INGREDIENT—GUNS, THE SECOND AMENDMENT,
AND THE STATE OF THE THREAT

Terrorism is hard. Causing large amounts of death is not easy to achieve,
and in fact, more than half of terror attacks result in no fatalities.131 Making
bombs, evading security, and choosing appropriate targets requires
complicated skills and analysis.132 Theorists have suggested that this is the
reason that terrorist recruits rarely reflect the types of social or economic
hardships that many instinctively believe would make individuals more
susceptible to a terrorist ideology.133 Instead, these theorists argue, the
recruitment pool is more widely reflective of society because terrorist
organizations are particularly interested in recruits who will bring valuable
skills to the organization, such as engineering, medical, and legal skills, as
well as the required levels of strategic thinking.134 As the FBI has noted,
terrorist organizations have specifically recognized these opportunities, and
have focused extra recruitment efforts on people with firearms expertise, for
instance, recruiting among law enforcement and the military.135
In traditional, group-oriented terrorism, aspiring terrorists might be
rejected from training camps because they lack the abilities the organization
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desires.136 The inadequacies of aspiring terrorists are exemplified by the plots
that never materialized, such as Jose Padilla’s plot to create material for a
dirty bomb by placing uranium “in a bucket . . . and swinging it around [his]
head as fast as possible for 45 minutes,”137 or the failures of Richard Reid
and Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab whose sweat apparently rendered their
bombs unusable.138 James Cromitie, who after agreeing to an undercover
informant’s cajoling to bomb a synagogue in the Bronx, New York, was
incapable of plugging the bomb in to make it operable, and forgot to set the
timer on one bomb when setting it in front of the synagogue.139 The need for
training, and the likelihood that aspiring terrorists would fail, has made it
possible for the United States to use less invasive methods to protect itself—
disrupting efforts to travel overseas, or heightening surveillance of people
who engage in such travel.140
But modern terrorists have managed to avoid this complication by
strategically choosing quantity over quality of attacks.141 By focusing on
activating predisposed loners, terrorist organizations have increased the
speed of the process, while decreasing the opportunities to interfere before
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attacks are realized.142 These attacks rely primarily on firearms, and they are
successful, in the United States. As one scholar noted,
“[T]errorist attacks involving firearms are less lethal than non-gun attacks in [other
countries] . . . but more lethal than non-gun attacks in the United States. Perhaps this
result is driven by the availability of high-capacity firearms in the United States, or the
firearms skills of the typical American compared with the skills of those in other
countries.”143

Where impulsiveness and a “loner” mentality might have interfered
with willingness to train or work to develop necessary strategic skills in
traditional terrorist groups, generalized knowledge about and access to
firearms erases this hurdle in the United States. The ability to avoid having
to train recruits further reduces the need for recruits to travel, and thereby
cuts off opportunities to detect threats.144 Lax gun laws, loose registration
policies, and large numbers of gun purchases prevent the government from
using gun purchases as a warning system.
In sum, this modern terrorism strategy works because weapons and
people experienced in those weapons are so readily available in the United
States. While the internet would still work as a platform for recruitment and
radicalization with or without guns, the availability of predisposed
individuals with ready access to guns and the knowledge of how to use those
guns is what makes those attacks likely, easier to inspire without detection,
and more lethal. In 2010, it was reasonable to think that there was little
possibility of a sustained terror threat without training from a terrorist
organization145 Were training still a necessary ingredient of successful
terrorist attacks, law enforcement could continue to disrupt and arrest
142
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really makes a difference. I mean, it is one thing to be radicalized over the Internet. Anybody
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a serious terrorist,” and providing examples of Americans who have gone for training). See
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aspiring terrorists when they travelled or engaged in training activities,146 or
lean on the confidence that a successful terrorist attack takes more skill than
most aspiring terrorists can acquire.147 But the preexisting access and
knowledge of guns, combined with modern strategies of low level attacks
have made this travel and training unnecessary.
This threat then feeds back into the analysis of risk performed by judges
and scholars in the face of websites directed at predisposed individuals. The
cases U.S. v. White and U.S. v. Sines are examples of instances where
incendiary speech is not only more likely to reach a party who is susceptible
to incitement, but also that at least some susceptible individual who has come
to that chatroom has the means and training necessary to act on that
incitement, before he can be detected and incapacitated. This threat, in turn,
makes judges and scholars more hesitant to protect speech, and more likely
to narrow First Amendment protection. Yet while the debate rages over the
need to reduce speech rights in response to the threat of terrorism, the Second
Amendment right to build an arsenal is ignored—even while that arsenal’s
availability eradicates those areas where law enforcement would normally
intercept and prevent terror activity.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the internet has fundamentally altered the
strategy, and therefore threat, of terrorists, both individuals and
organizations. The internet has made it easier to recruit, organizations can
avoid financial costs, can use fewer recruiters or even bots, and can avoid the
need for a safe space to train recruits. These physical and financial savings
then cut into the options law enforcement once had to detect and disrupt terror
plots, or to weaken organizations.
But the final erasure of opportunities to disrupt lethal terror attacks is
the pre-training of potential recruits and ready availability of weapons. Once,
law enforcement could limit its observation of potential terrorists to those
with the most likelihood of launching successful attacks (i.e., those who had
undergone extensive radicalization and training, often travelling to a training
camp). Now, the prevalence of Americans with easy access to guns,
combined with internet recruitment and a willingness to rely on low level
attacks, has stolen that enforcement opportunity.
Similarly, while courts might once have relied on counterspeech, small
audiences, and the rarity of individuals who could launch the types of attacks
146
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terrorist organizations were urging, the combination of the reach of the
internet, the use of algorithms, and the prevalence of people who are trained
or can train themselves in guns have combined to erase those opportunities.
Options to implement less restrictive impositions on speech are quickly
disappearing in the face of well-armed extremists, ready and waiting to be
activated.
It is the combination of training, rabbit holes, and weapons that makes
the threat of domestic terrorism as large as it is today, which has resulted in
a push for increased government surveillance and decreased speech
protections. 148 However, this increased government surveillance runs a
strong likelihood of chilling pure political speech.149 Government restrictions
on speech are likely to be employed unequally, particularly against politically
disfavored groups.150 New statutes criminalizing terrorism suffer the same
problem.151 What’s more, attempts to cut down the threat by suspending chat
rooms or surveilling speech may well push extremists further into the dark
recesses of the internet, where they have better protections against
counterspeech and detection.152
Scholars and courts have stepped away from an absolutist framework of
speech protections in the face of this threat153—a threat that is largely a
product of Second Amendment protections. Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment protections similarly yield to the need to protect against terror
attacks. Increasing limits on firearms purchases, registration requirements,
and other low-level restrictions on gun ownership might provide law
enforcement with the ability to identify and act on terror threats without
threatening the First Amendment and the democratic functions it performs.
To ignore the possibility that the Second Amendment, too, should bend to
these threats, while simultaneously engaging in discussions of how the First,
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Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments must bend, is philosophically
inconsistent, as well as blatantly disrespectful of the anti-tyrannical purposes
of Constitutional criminal procedure.
As it stands, the Second Amendment is sheltered from these
considerations, while it actively undermines the protection of the other
Amendments. It is a cannibal, eating our civil liberties from the inside.

